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I. INTRODUCTION
Barak D. Richman and Steven L. Schwarcz argue that healthcare providers
played a central—and failing—role in stemming the fallout from the COVID19 pandemic.1 Analogizing to the financial crisis of 2008, they view our
healthcare system as a collection of providers, each maximizing returns to its
own stakeholders in a laissez-faire regulatory environment that ignored the
essential interconnectedness of providers.2 Because neither hospitals nor
regulators were attuned to this interconnectedness, our healthcare system was
unprepared for the pandemic, resulting in a reduced standard of care.3 Just as
Dodd-Frank and related legislation view financial institutions as part of a larger,
interconnected system that must be regulated to minimize exposure to and build
robustness against shocks, so too must federal regulators approach our
healthcare providers as a “system” that can work as a collective to mitigate the
fallout from shocks.
We believe this narrative overstates the role of healthcare providers in
managing pandemics. The narrative hinges on a theory of market failure:
Healthcare providers act in their own self-interest but, in doing so, impose a
negative externality by rendering the healthcare system fragile in the face of a
pandemic.4 We are skeptical of this view. To explain why, we draw on an
accepted framework for pandemic management: Pandemics can be prevented
and managed through (i) ex ante investments in prevention and (ii) ex post
 Columbia Law School.
† Columbia Law School.

We thank Joshua Faber, Stephanie Zone Klein, Barak Richman, and Steven Schwarcz for
helpful comments and conversations.
1 See Barak D. Richman & Steven L. Schwarcz, Macromedical Regulation, 82 OHIO
ST. L.J. 727, 743 (2021).
2 See id. at 742–43.
3 See id. at 742–44.
4 Id. at 763–65.
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strategies for containment and treatment.5 Ex ante investments include
monitoring systems that track infections globally, scientific research targeting
vaccines and therapies, policies to prevent spread, and public education
programs.6 Ex post strategies include halting elective procedures, reallocating
beds and other resources to infected patients, and sharing resources and
information between healthcare providers.7 Ex ante investments are arguably
the most important steps a government can take in handling pandemics, and yet
healthcare providers play a distinctly second-order role in making these
investments. We do not see evidence that, during the COVID-19 pandemic,
healthcare providers failed to act as faithful agents of government policy. Thus,
with respect to ex ante investments, we see no market failure warranting
macromedical regulation of healthcare providers.
Healthcare providers do play a first-order role in implementing ex post
strategies, including halting elective procedures and reallocating resources.8
Along this dimension, Richman and Schwarcz present compelling evidence of
market failure: Atomistic healthcare providers failed to share information and
resources at critical moments during the pandemic’s surge.9 Although we agree
with the authors’ diagnosis of the problem, we disagree with their solution. We
worry about mandates that raise provider costs, which may be difficult to pass
on to patients and, as a result, trigger distress or closures with adverse
consequences for patient health.10 Because public health is a social problem,
like national defense, we recommend subsidies to providers that invest in
pandemic-mitigation capacity (just as we have subsidized various industries
during wartime efforts).11 We also worry about changes to corporate governance
because these changes assume that profit-maximization is what induces
5 This simplifies the more detailed framework outlined by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and other agencies. See, e.g., Pandemic Intervals Framework (PIF),
CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/national-strategy/intervals-framework.html
[https://perma.cc/4TGG-4TQ4]; HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 3 (2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemicinfluenza-strategy-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/38SY-23Y9] [hereinafter HOMELAND 2005].
6 See HOMELAND 2005, supra note 5, at 4–8.
7 See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 109–11 (2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462625 [https://
perma.cc/7WQL-H8WX] [hereinafter HOMELAND 2006].
8 See Hailey Mensik, Hospitals Across US Cancel Elective Procedures – Again,
HEALTHCARE DIVE (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/hospitalscancel-elective-procedures-once-again/589202/ [https://perma.cc/ZX9U-PK68]; HOMELAND
2006, supra note 7, at 110.
9 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 767–68.
10 See Richard C. Lindrooth, Marcelo C. Perraillon, Rose Y. Hardy & Gregory J. Tung,
Understanding the Relationship Between Medicaid Expansions and Hospital Closures, 37
HEALTH AFFS. 111, 117–19 (2018); Kritee Gujral & Anirban Basu, Impact of Rural and
Urban Hospital Closures on Inpatient Mortality 14–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 26182, 2019).
11 See Robert Higgs, Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the
1940s, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 41, 54 (1992).

2021]

WHERE IS THE MARKET FAILURE?

835

atomistic behavior of providers, who ignore the consequences of their behavior
for public health.12 That may be true, but more evidence is needed. And if
nonprofits behave like for-profits, as the authors state,13 this suggests that
whatever is driving provider behavior is more complex than a simple profitmaximization motive.

II. SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE CASE FOR MACROMEDICAL REGULATION
Systemic risk describes the possibility that a key sector of the economy can
collapse and destabilize the rest of the economy.14 There are many pathways for
systemic risk.15 The pathway that has most concerned regulators is contagion:
One institution may experience a financial shock that causes it to fail, and its
failure can “infect” other firms and cause their failure.16 The 2008 financial
crisis illustrates the contagion phenomenon. When real estate prices plunged in
multiple parts of the United States, the shock destabilized the entire financial
industry because (a) the industry had created financial instruments that allowed
a wide cross section of institutions to make investments keyed to the value of
the same real estate; (b) financial institutions had so many claims against each
other that, even if one institution had no direct exposure to real estate, it had
indirect exposure via its claims against other institutions; and (c) as some banks
hemorrhaged, investors worried that others might be similarly fragile and
responded by restricting the supply of credit to other institutions, thereby
threatening their viability.17
Richman and Schwarcz see parallels between the 2008 financial crisis and
the COVID-19 pandemic.18 In the case of the pandemic, the trigger was the
arrival of an infectious disease.19 The transmission mechanism was the ease
with which COVID-19 can be passed between human beings, not the
interconnectedness of health providers.20 But that interconnectedness was
important nonetheless: It was a missed opportunity to mitigate the fallout from
COVID-19 infections; providers failed to invest sufficiently in ICU beds, interhospital communications and transfers, and securing sufficient stockpiles of
equipment and testing supply lines.21 This failure would have been avoided,

12 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 769–70.
13 Id. at 772.
14 T. R. HURD, CONTAGION! SYSTEMIC RISK IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS 6 (2016).
15 See id. at 14–16.
16 PAWEŁ SMAGA, SYSTEMIC RISK CTR., THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 10–11

(2014), https://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/sp-5.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T3J7-STFL].
17 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 733–35.
18 Id. at 763.
19 Id. at 728–29.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 744–48.
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Richman and Schwarcz argue, if there had been greater regulation focusing on
the way the healthcare industry operates as a system.22
Richman and Schwarcz argue that healthcare regulators should follow the
lead of regulators in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis: Financial regulators
implemented a four-prong approach to managing systemic risk in the financial
sector: (i) limiting risk-taking behavior that generates negative externalities; (ii)
increasing the resilience of financial institutions by increasing the financial
resources available to manage, withstand, and prevent the spread of a shock;
(iii) managing market failures, including agency problems and misinformation;
and (iv) vesting the federal government with power to stem contagion.23
Richman and Schwarcz recommend the same approach for the healthcare sector.
First, because profit-seeking hospitals underinvest in public health, regulators
should “require hospitals to assume financial responsibility for the costs of
pandemics” and invest in capacity to address sudden demand surges.24 Second,
regulators should require hospitals to collect and share data on caseloads and
the use of key resources.25 Hospitals should also be stress-tested to gauge their
ability to respond to demand surges arising from crises.26 Third, regulators
should consider imposing “some type of a public governance duty” on
healthcare providers and thereby counteract current governance incentives.27
Finally, the federal government should empower an agency to monitor
healthcare providers and be a source of support for stressed providers during a
crisis.28

III. THE LIMITED CASE FOR MACROMEDICAL REGULATION
We are skeptical that the financial crisis of 2008 provides a useful
framework for thinking about pandemics and regulation of healthcare
providers.29 To be sure, there are parallels between the two crises. In both, a
shock reverberated throughout the economic system.30 In both, a crisis was
exacerbated by uncoordinated behavior of profit-maximizing institutions.31 But
those parallels ignore key differences between the crises. In the financial system,
banks and other institutions are both (a) trigger and (b) vector of contagion.32
22 See id. at 775–76.
23 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 736–39.
24 Id. at 765.
25 Id. at 767.
26 Id. at 768.
27 Id. at 771–72.
28 Id. at 774–75.
29 See Thomas P. Miller, Will New Macromedical Regulation Be Prudential?, 82 OHIO

ST. L.J. 803, 803–06 (2021).
30 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 728–29.
31 Id. at 763.
32 See Paul Glasserman & H. Peyton Young, Contagion in Financial Networks, 54 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 779, 783–86 (2016) (offering examples of individual firms causing
spillover contagion to interconnected firms during the 2007–2008 financial crisis).
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That is, systemic risk can arise endogenously from financial institutions because
(i) they are able to take enormous risks while (ii) anticipating government rescue
if those risks go south.33
Healthcare providers are different. Generally, they are neither (a) trigger nor
(b) vector of contagion.34 Although it is theoretically possible for a hospital to
be the trigger of a pandemic, it appears rarely to be the case (the one exception
might be “Typhoid Mary”).35 We are also unaware of evidence that the COVID19 pandemic was transmitted across hospitals because of their
interconnectedness.36 Indeed, the problem in healthcare is the lack of
interconnectedness among hospitals: Inadequate coordination prevented many
hospitals from providing the care patients needed.37 Although Richman and
Schwarcz emphasize that healthcare is a “system,” it is little different from any
system that has complex inputs and whose performance is critical during times
of crisis. Healthcare is a system in the same sense that the steel industry was a
system during World War II.38
Because banks are both trigger and vector of contagion, it’s unsurprising
that regulators focus on the behavior of banks and other financial institutions.
But it would be a mistake for post-pandemic regulation to focus on healthcare
providers in the same way. Policymakers have identified “pillars” for managing
pandemic risk: (i) monitoring disease outbreaks, at home and abroad; (ii) public
education and engagement with community-based organizations; (iii)
surveillance, testing, quarantining, and treatment of infected individuals; (iv)
regulating points of entry, international travel, and mass gatherings; (v)
investing in laboratories and diagnostics; (vi) protecting health workers and
preventing spread in health facilities; (vii) ensuring that health providers have
the most recent information and necessary equipment to treat infected patients,
especially during demand surges; (viii) establishing a robust supply chain to
33 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 736.
34 See generally Dana Robinson & Ann Battenfield, The Worst Outbreaks in U.S.

History, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/worst-diseaseoutbreaks-history [https://perma.cc/MV8K-9SM2] (detailing the history of noteworthy
outbreaks of contagion in the United States; in that history, only the 1906–07 Typhoid Mary
outbreak was an instance of a healthcare provider being either the trigger or vector of an
outbreak).
35 Id.
36 See Chanu Rhee et al., Incidence of Nosocomial COVID-19 in Patients Hospitalized
at a Large US Academic Medical Center, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2770287 [https://perma.cc
/KK82-JZZS].
37 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 744–48.
38 In their rejoinder, Richman and Schwarcz ignore these problems with their
conceptualization of healthcare as a “system.” See Barak D. Richman & Steven L. Schwarcz,
On Skepticism, Modesty, and Embracing Those with Whom We Disagree: A Rejoinder, 82
OHIO ST. L.J. 869, 871–73 (2021). While there is some degree of interconnectedness among
healthcare providers, that interconnectedness is rarely, if ever, a vector of contagion. See
generally Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 34.
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health providers; (ix) ensuring that healthcare remains available for all
conditions during a pandemic; and (x) vaccination.39
Most of these pillars require ex ante investments in pandemic preparedness
by government agencies.40 This is most obviously true for (i) through (v), (viii)
and (x). With respect to these pillars, healthcare providers play, at most, a
second-order role in the management of pandemic risk. By second order, we
mean that providers can help implement government policy (by, for example,
administering vaccines). To the extent that healthcare regulation is needed, it is
only to ensure that providers are faithful agents of government policy. For
example, there is tentative evidence that for-profit providers were less willing
than nonprofit providers to defer elective procedures during the pandemic.41 If
so, regulation might be needed to ensure that for-profit providers adapt their
operations in ways that are consistent with public policies seeking to limit
spread. However, most pandemic strategies rely on the government, not
healthcare providers.
With respect to the other pillars—(vi) protecting healthcare workers and
minimizing spread at facilities, (vii) ensuring adequate supply of information
and equipment, and (ix) ensuring that healthcare for non-pandemic illness
remains available—healthcare providers play a first-order role. Hospitals need
to invest in protecting their workers, equipping facilities for demand surges, and
ensuring non-pandemic-related care. Notice, though, that the role of hospitals is
to react to infections, not to preempt pandemics. In that sense, healthcare
providers are playing, at most, a backup role to government policies investing
in pandemic prevention. This is not to say that all pandemic preparedness going
forward ought to rely on ex ante investments; instead, we suggest that focusing
exclusively on ex post strategies neglects a critical part of preventing a public
health crisis from spiraling out of control. To be sure, as Richman and Schwarcz
emphasize, hospitals failed to play this backup role properly.42 They struggled
with unmet demand surges and resource mismatches, in which some hospitals
had too many beds or ventilators or personal protective equipment while others
were overrun with patients and could not obtain the supplies they needed.43
39 WORLD HEALTH ORG., COVID-19 STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN

13–17 (2021).
40 See id. at 13–17.
41 Walter C. Jean, Natasha T. Ironside, Kenneth D. Sack, Daniel R. Felbaum & Hasan
R. Syed, The Impact of Covid-19 on Neurosurgeons and the Strategy for Triaging NonEmergent Operations: A Global Neurosurgery Study, 162 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA 1229,
1236 (2020).
42 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 743.
43 The Daily, The Mistakes New York Made, N.Y. TIMES, at 12:42 (July 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/podcasts/the-daily/new-york-hospitals-covid.html (on file
with the Ohio State Law Journal); see also Ilene Grossman, COVID-19 Pandemic Strained
Usual Interstate Resource Sharing During Emergencies, but Also Underscored Value of
Cross-Border Cooperation, COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS MIDWEST (Aug. 15, 2020),
https://csgmidwest.org/covid-19-pandemic-strained-usual-interstate-resource-sharing-during-
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Additionally, providers did not communicate effectively, making it difficult to
collect comprehensive data and overcome resource disparities.44 Intervention is
clearly necessary to ensure that hospitals fulfill their first-order roles.
What is the appropriate regulatory response to these failings? To answer
that question, we first need to identify the pathologies underlying these failures.

IV. WHAT SHOULD MACROMEDICAL REGULATION LOOK LIKE?
Richman and Schwarcz point to two pathologies: the profit motive and the
lack of interconnectedness among hospitals.45
Many hospitals in the United States are for-profit institutions46 (and even
the nonprofits behave like for-profits47). The profit motive can distort the
behavior of health providers in ways that are harmful to public health.48 For
example, it seems to have induced providers to invest heavily in elective
procedures at the expense of primary care.49 Many hospitals halted elective
surgeries to reallocate resources to COVID-19 patients.50 As a result, a
significant number of hospitals entered financial distress, especially those that
took on a large number of uninsured patients and Medicaid patients.51 In 2020,
at least thirty-six hospitals filed for bankruptcy in the United States and almost

emergencies-but-also-underscored-value-of-cross-border-cooperation/ [https://perma.cc/Y75MPSWB].
44 Jayson Marwaha, John D. Halamka & Gabriel Brat, Lifesaving Ventilators Will Sit
Unused Without a National Data-Sharing Effort, STAT (May 4, 2020), https://www.statnews.com
/2020/05/04/ventilators-sit-unused-without-national-data-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/LTM6RVGR].
45 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 763–64, 767–68.
46 E.g., Hospitals by Ownership Type, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org
/other/state-indicator/hospitals-by-ownership/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22
colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/XV2X-MG8Z]
(showing that, in 2019, twenty-four percent of hospitals were for-profit entities).
47 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 772.
48 Id. at 763.
49 Elective procedures are highly profitable for hospitals, often generating $700 more
per admission than emergency procedures. See Dhruv Khullar, Amelia M. Bond & William
L. Schpero, COVID-19 and the Financial Health of US Hospitals, 323 JAMA 2127, 2127
(2020).
50 See States Limiting Elective Procedures in Hospitals, Resuming Surgery in All
Settings, AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY (July 16, 2020), https://www.aao.org/practicemanagement/article/states-begin-easing-elective-procedure-restriction [https://perma.cc/NW86QBRR].
51 Paula Moura, What Is a Safety-Net Hospital and Why Is It So Hard to Define?, PBS:
FRONTLINE (May 18, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-a-safetynet-hospital-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/7JD7-7E27].
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two-thirds of hospitals were in financial distress.52 It is estimated that rural
hospitals lost around 70% of their income in 2020 due to delayed procedures.53
Perhaps, then, macromedical regulation should constrain the profit-seeking
motive of hospitals, as Richman and Schwarcz recommend? We are skeptical
that the profit motive is a key driver of hospital missteps during the pandemic.
Our skepticism derives from the fact that for-profits account for less than a
quarter of all hospitals in the United States54 and from the absence of data
showing that nonprofits were better prepared for the pandemic than their forprofit counterparts. Some preliminary data suggests that nonprofits were more
likely to suspend elective procedures,55 but more data is needed before we can
conclude that hospitals will be better equipped to handle pandemics if regulators
constrain their profit motive.56
Moreover, we worry that resource constraints—not the profit motive—
explain the failures at many hospitals. High-profit hospitals, especially those in
urban areas, had far more beds and fewer COVID-19 deaths than less profitable
hospitals.57 High-profit hospitals were also able to obtain supplies, such as
personal protective equipment, because they could outbid other hospitals.58
Thus, some disparities across hospitals appear to be a function of resources and
funding, not excessive risk-taking or a failure to prepare for demand surges. To
52 Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Shaky U.S. Hospitals Risk Bankruptcy in Latest Covid

Wave, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-1014/shaky-u-s-hospitals-risk-bankruptcy-in-latest-covid-wave [https://perma.cc/89M9-XS6D].
53 Sarah Jane Tribble, Rural Hospitals Are Sinking Under COVID-19 Financial
Pressures, NPR (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/22
/904455215/rural-hospitals-are-sinking-under-covid-19-financial-pressures [https://perma.cc
/2SA7-FQMR]. This is not a new phenomenon—rural hospital closures have been making
headlines for years—and even before 2020, a third of hospitals were losing money. ColemanLochner, supra note 52. Hospitals have been consolidating in wealthy, urban areas and
healthcare providers have shifted towards outpatient care, putting even more financial
pressure on poor or rural areas. See Shawn Baldwin, Why US Hospitals Are Closing, CNBC
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/14/how-the-mayo-clinic-and-partnershealthcare-make-money.html [https://perma.cc/X9PQ-G9UG].
54 Hospitals by Ownership Type, supra note 46.
55 See Jean, Ironside, Sack, Felbaum & Syed, supra note 41, at 1236.
56 Perhaps lessons can be drawn from New Jersey’s experiment with governance during
the pandemic: Three nonprofit hospital CEOs were authorized to make strategic and
operational decisions for all acute care hospitals in the state. See N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 20-007, AUTHORIZATION FOR NEW JERSEY’S LEVEL I TRAUMA
CENTERS TO COORDINATE REGIONAL EFFORTS RELATED TO COVID-19 SURGE PLANNING &
EXPANDING HOSPITAL BED CAPACITY 3 (2020), https://nj.gov/health/legal/covid19/4-1120_ExecutiveDirectiveNo20-007RegionalCoordinators.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZZW-9L2J].
57 Brian M. Rosenthal, Joseph Goldstein, Sharon Otterman & Sheri Fink, Why
Surviving the Virus Might Come Down to Which Hospital Admits You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25.
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/nyregion/Coronavirus-hospitals.html [https://
perma.cc/NE5Z-RV5T].
58 See Tucker Doherty, Health Providers’ Scramble for Staff and Supplies Reveals
Sharp Disparities, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/14
/coronavirus-health-care-supplies-disparities-395105 [https://perma.cc/2A4T-9D8V].
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be sure, many providers prioritized profits and underinvested in public health,
even going so far as to try to avoid accepting transfers of COVID-19 patients
without insurance,59 but many hospitals in poor and rural areas could not invest
further in pandemic preparedness.60 In fact, most hospitals in the United States
likely could not shoulder this new financial burden. The median operating
margin for a hospital in 2018, prior to the start of the pandemic, was 2.0% and
the median hospital had about fifty-three days’ cash on hand; hospitals at the
twenty-fifth percentile, however, had a -4.4% operating margin and 7.6 days
cash on hand.61 The average margin among the bottom quartile was -14.5%.62
These statistics show that, if hospitals are unable to pass on the costs of
mandates to patients (which, the evidence shows, they are unable to do63), we
should worry about their ability to shoulder those costs. Mandating that
hospitals further invest in their capacity to address demand surges could
bankrupt many hospitals, especially in poor and rural areas where there are
fewer available options.64
Another potential pathology is the fragmentation of our healthcare system.
The atomistic behavior of providers, Richman and Schwarcz argue, prevented
coordination that could have ensured a more effective response to the
pandemic.65 Yet global data suggest that the severity of COVID-19 is not
strongly correlated with the interconnectedness of healthcare providers.66
Although the United States continues to have the most confirmed cases over the
course of the pandemic, differences between the United States and other
countries attenuate when case rates are normalized by population.67 The United
States, for example, had comparable death rates to Italy and the United
Kingdom,68 both of which have universal healthcare systems without a profit

59 See The Mistakes New York Made, supra note 43, at 14:01.
60 Indeed, some critics point to government regulation as one reason why many

hospitals had too few beds during the pandemic. See Justin Haskins, America’s Hospitals
Are Unprepared for Coronavirus – Here’s Why You Should Blame Government, HILL (Mar.
21, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/488783-americas-hospitals-are-unprepared-forcoronavirus-heres-why-you-should?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/YWH7-JPEA].
61 Khullar, Bond & Schpero, supra note 49, at 2127.
62 John Romley, Pre-COVID-19, Many Hospitals Were in Good Financial Shape, USC
LEONARD D. SCHAEFFER CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y & ECON. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
healthpolicy.usc.edu/evidence-base/pre-coronavirus-hospital-financials-variedconsiderably/ [https://perma.cc/LGG3-BG9Z].
63 See, e.g., Lindrooth, Perraillon, Hardy & Tung, supra note 10, at 119.
64 See Tribble, supra note 53.
65 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 743–45.
66 See generally Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS
RES. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2021), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality [https://perma.cc/3L9KYGDG] [hereinafter JOHNS HOPKINS].
67 Id.
68 Id.
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motive.69 Spain and France had slightly fewer deaths per 100,000,70 yet France
is considered one of the best universal healthcare systems in the world.71 If we
look at the case-fatality rate, the puzzle deepens further. The United States had
a lower case-fatality rate than Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and France.72 Although exact calculations for casefatality rates can vary based on country,73 these data raise doubts about whether
healthcare interconnectedness had a sizable impact on pandemic outcomes.
Even if fragmentation was an important driver of pandemic outcomes,74 the
nature of the “fragmentation” needs to be specified carefully. In the United
States, a major fragmentation problem was the lack of information-sharing
across hospitals.75 The federal government, for example, was able to obtain a
large supply of ventilators, but lacked the information necessary to distribute
them to hospitals in most need.76
What is the appropriate policy response to this fragmentation problem?
Richman and Schwarcz argue that health providers should be required to
“assume financial responsibility for the costs of pandemics and thus financially
induce them to prepare for population crises.”77 Regulators might “stress test”
69 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE AND HEALTH
OUTCOMES 23 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Universal-Health-Coverageand-Health-Outcomes-OECD-G7-Health-Ministerial-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KKG-J4F8].
70 JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 66.
71 Charlotte Morabito, France’s Health-Care System Was Ranked as the World’s
Best—Here’s How It Compares with the US’, CNBC (June 11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com
/2019/05/17/france-versus-the-united-states-how-the-two-nations-health-care-systems-compare
.html [https://perma.cc/2PAY-HP2D]. On the other hand, all of these nations performed
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per 100,000. JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 66.
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providers to verify that they have made necessary investments to address
demand surges.78 And because regulators are often fighting “last year’s war,”
Richman and Schwarcz suggest imposing a governance duty on healthcare
providers to promote public health.79
It is telling, though, that when Richman and Schwarcz advocate a “duty to
stockpile,” they defend this duty, in part, on the ground that the government has
a poor track record in stockpiling.80 The authors, in other words, believe that the
private sector has an advantage, relative to the government, in performing a
public health mission. But when the government pursues a public policy
mission, we expect it to fund that mission using tax dollars because the mission
benefits society generally. That’s most obviously true for public health
missions, which definitionally benefit the public. Richman and Schwarcz,
however, would impose unfunded mandates on private healthcare providers.81
Hospitals would not be subsidized for protecting public health (a positive
externality).82 They would have to bear the costs and, to the extent they can,
shift those costs to patients.83 If providers shift all costs to patients, we will—in
theory—have a world that’s similar to one where tax dollars are used to
subsidize healthcare providers. Either way, patients will be paying for the public
health investments—through higher health costs charged by providers or
through higher taxes charged by the government. We should worry, however,
that many hospitals may be unable to shift all costs to patients.84 If so, these
hospitals could suffer financial distress and potentially shut down, with adverse
health consequences for patients.85

V. CONCLUSION
We think unfunded mandates are a mistake. Public health is a public
problem. If health providers must be enlisted to protect the public, they should
be subsidized as they foster this positive externality. Imposing unfunded
macromedical regulations is far more likely to bankrupt hospitals servicing lowincome or rural regions, leaving these areas even more vulnerable.86
78 Id. at 768.
79 Id. at 772.
80 Id. at 769; see also Amy B. Monahan, Two Cheers for the US Health Security

Infrastructure, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 830 (2021).
81 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 767 n.235.
82 See id. at 772.
83 AM. HOSP. ASS’N, REGULATORY OVERLOAD: ASSESSING THE REGULATORY BURDEN
ON HEALTH SYSTEMS, HOSPITALS AND POST-ACUTE CARE PROVIDERS 3 (2017), https://
www.aha.org/system/files/2018-02/regulatory-overload-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTR4RAGP].
84 See Lindrooth, Perraillon, Hardy & Tung, supra note 10, at 117; Austin B. Frakt,
How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 MILBANK Q. 90, 109–10
(2011).
85 Gujral & Basu, supra note 10, at 14–15.
86 See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 52.
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Regulations ought to instead focus on preventing hospitals from getting
overwhelmed and helping to provide resources to ensure that a crisis like
COVID-19 does not happen again. This has little to do with regulating the
healthcare industry as a system and much more to do with reassessing our
understanding of the likelihood of a pandemic, thus making sure the government
is fulfilling its first-order role in preparing for public health emergencies and
that healthcare providers are acting as good second-order agents.

